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Intergenerational Mobility in England, 1858-
2012.  Wealth, Surnames, and Social 
Mobility. 
 
Gregory Clark, University of California, Davis 
Neil Cummins, LSE1 
 
This paper uses a panel of 21,618 people with rare surnames whose 
wealth is observed at death in England and Wales 1858-2012 to measure 
the intergeneration elasticity of wealth over five generations.  We show, 
using rare surnames to track families, that wealth is much more 
persistent over generations than standard one generation estimates 
would suggest.  There is still a significant correlation between the wealth 
of families five generations apart.  We show that this finding can be 
reconciled with standard estimates of wealth mobility by positing an 
underlying Markov process of wealth inheritance with an 
intergenerational elasticity of 0.70-0.75 throughout the years 1858-2012.  
The enormous social and economic changes of this long period had 
surprisingly little effect on the strength of inheritance of wealth. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
There is strong popular and academic interest in the intergenerational 
mobility of wealth, but for most countries until recently little systematic evidence 
on its character.  For England, for example, the only extensive study looking at 
wealth at death is that of Colin Harbury and David Hitchins, which compared 
wealth at death of rich fathers and sons in the interval 1902-1973.2  There is thus 
no knowledge for England of what the current intergenerational elasticity of 
wealth at death is, or of how it compares with earlier generations before the 
adoption of the modern fiscal state with extensive taxation and redistribution of 
income and wealth. 
                                                          
1 Joseph Burke, Tatsuya Ishii, and Claire Phan provided excellent research assistance.  
Thanks to Kim Harrison and Ancestry.com.  This project would not have been possible 
without their astonishing quantities of data, and their generosity in allowing researchers 
access to this.   Clark received financial support from NSF grant SES 09-62351, 2010-
2012. 
2 Harbury and Hitchins, 1979.  There seem to be no studies of wealth inheritance at 
other stages in the life cycle for England. 
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 In this paper we utilize a newly constructed database recording the wealth at 
death of 21,618 people with rare surnames in England and Wales 1858-2012 to 
estimate the intergenerational elasticity of wealth over five generations.  These 
generations experience very different social and economic regimes.  In particular 
taxation of income, and of inherited wealth, became substantial for upper income 
groups in the years 1945-1980.  Constructing this database necessitated collecting 
by hand from the Principal Probate Registry in London the probate details of 
everyone in the database dying 1967-2012, as well as hand collecting death 
records 2006-12. 
Because we use rare surnames, for about a fifth of the sample we can link 
many people to their fathers and estimate the intergenerational elasticity in the 
conventional way.   But this linking again heavily depends on hand inspection of 
an extensive set of records that potentially reveal family relationships over the 
years 1770-2012.  We find that the intergenerational elasticity, measured this way, 
averages 0.43-0.50, and shows little evidence of variation across generations.  
This is close to the estimates of Harbury and Hitchins from the same source 
1902-1973.3   It also suggests wealth mobility rates in England are in line with 
earnings mobility estimates.4 
The results from the individual links, suggesting a stable intergenerational 
elasticity of wealth at death across very different social and economic regimes are 
themselves interesting.  However, if we link the generations instead by grouping 
people into surname cohorts, we find a much greater intergenerational elasticity 
of wealth across generations for the surname cohorts of close to 0.75 for all 
periods.  This elasticity is so strong that surnames with the highest average wealth 
in the initial generation, 1858-87, remain the wealthiest even in 1999-2012. 
In the methods section below, section 2, we develop a simple model of 
social mobility that can reconcile the very different estimates of the rate of wealth 
mobility at the individual and group level.  This model argues that wealth at death 
has two components: a systematic one which is inherited with a high degree of 
elasticity across generations, and a chance component which is not inherited.  
This simple model produces a number of predictions about the structure of 
elasticities in wealth across multiple generations that we test empirically using our 
panel of data. 
                                                          
3 Harbury and Hitchens, 1979, estimate the intergenerational wealth elasticity in England 
to be 0.48-0.59. 
4 Dearden et al., 1997, and Nicoletti and Ermisch, 2008 report earnings elasticity 
estimates in the range 0.22-0.69. 
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In section 3 we describe the construction of our data panel, and outline 
some imperfections we need to deal with in these probate estimates of wealth at 
death. 
In section 4 we derive estimates of the intergenerational elasticity of wealth 
in the two ways listed above.  We show that the divergent estimates are not the 
product of the imperfections in the wealth data detailed in section 3.  Finally we 
show that our data meets all the predictions of the simple model developed in the 
methods section to reconcile these divergent results.    
In the concluding section we consider the implications of these results for 
social mobility studies in general.  We argue that they imply that conventional 
estimates looking at social mobility on particular aspects of status, such as wealth, 
will greatly overstate the mobility of families on broader estimates of social status.  
They also show that wealth mobility measured at the group level – for racial, 
religious, or national origin groups – will again be much lower than measured at 
the individual level. 
 
2.  Methods 
The intergenerational elasticity of wealth is estimated conventionally by 
estimating the β in the equation 
   𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡+1  =   𝛽𝑤𝑗𝑡  +   𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡         
 (1) 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑡 is measured wealth in generation t, normalized to mean 0, j indexes 
fathers, i indexes their children, and 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a random component.   We make 
such estimates below where we know the familial connections, and they are 
stable and relatively precise over the years 1858-2012. 
If we form any grouping of parents and children in generation t, indexed by 
k, defined just by the wealth of fathers and calculate the b in the expression 
𝑤�𝑖𝑘𝑡+1  =   𝛽𝐴𝑤�𝑖𝑘𝑡      
(2) 
then the expected value of 𝛽𝐴 will be β.   For example, we could take people by 
wealth decile in generation t, average wealth across their children, and calculate 
𝛽𝐴 for each decile in this way.    
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We shall see below, however, is that if we do something analogous to (2), 
but in this case form an estimated average wealth by generation by aggregating 
individuals into 30 year surname cohorts, and calculate 𝛽𝐴  from the average 
wealth of these cohorts, the calculated 𝛽𝐴  is much higher than the individual 
family elasticities.  This is despite the fact that the 𝛽𝐴  estimated for surname 
groupings would be expected to be downwards biased compared to the 
underlying β for families.  This is because in the surname cohorts all people in a 
30 year window are counted in the wealth average equally, whether they have 0 or 
10 children.  The errors this introduces compared to using the direct familial 
relationships will predictably downward bias the 𝛽𝐴  estimated from surname 
groups compared to the familial β. 
We posit the following simple model to explain this difference.  We assume 
that measured wealth at death is the sum of two components so that   
   𝑤𝑖𝑡  =   𝑥𝑖𝑡  +  𝑒𝑖𝑡          
 (3) 
where  𝑥𝑖𝑡 is underlying social status of a person, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a random component 
linking wealth to that underlying status.  We also assume  𝑥𝑖𝑡 evolves according 
to the simple AR1 process 
   𝑥𝑖𝑡+1  =   𝑏𝑥𝑖𝑡  +   𝑢𝑖𝑡         
 (4) 
In this case the observed intergenerational elasticity of wealth estimated 
conventionally from equation (1) will be such that 
      𝐸�?̂?� =   𝑏 1
1+�
𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎𝑥
2�
= 𝑏𝜃     
 (5) 
where 𝜎𝑥2 is the variance of the underlying social status, and 𝜎𝑢2 is the variance of 
the random components linking the underlying status to wealth.5  ?̂? will be an 
underestimate of b, the underlying elasticity across generations of social status.   
 The 𝛽𝐴  estimated from looking at average wealth by groupings such as 
wealth deciles of fathers will also be a biased estimate of b.  This is because in the 
limit, with such a grouping,   
                                                          
5 𝜃 =   1
1+�
𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎𝑥
2�
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𝛽𝐴 =  𝑤�𝑖𝑘𝑡+1𝑤�𝑖𝑘𝑡  =  ?̅?𝑖𝑘𝑡+1?̅?𝑖𝑘𝑡+ ?̅?𝑖𝑘     
(6) 
where ?̅?𝑖𝑘 ≠ 0.  However, where people are grouped by rare surnames based on 
the earlier measured average wealth of the surname, this will give an unbiased 
estimate of the underlying b.  For in such a case, in the limit, ?̅?𝑖𝑘 = 0.   
 This model of the underlying structure of wealth mobility stated above, of an 
underlying AR1 process, has implications for the values of the higher order 
elasticities between wealth across generations.  Assuming that the attenuation 
factor 𝜃 is the same in all generations, if we estimate βn in the expression 
   𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡+𝑛  =   𝛽𝑛𝑤𝑗𝑡  +   𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡         
 (7) 
then 𝐸(?̂?𝑛) =  𝜃𝑏𝑛.  We are able to test this below for n = 2 and n = 3. 
 The model also has implications for the implied values of the coefficients if 
we estimate a regression of social status as a function of status of both fathers 
and grandfathers, as in  
   𝑤𝑡  =    𝛽𝑡−1𝑤𝑡−1  +   𝛽𝑡−2𝑤𝑡−2  +  𝑣𝑡    
 (8) 
Even though the underlying model implies that the only influence on generation 
t+1 comes from the status of the previous generation t, when we estimate this 
relationship empirically it will appear that the grandparent generation have some 
influence on the wealth of the current generation.  But in this model, this is just 
because the grandparent wealth provides information on what the likely true 
underlying status of the parents is. 
 
If b is the underlying rate of social mobility, and θ is the attenuation factor, 
then  
𝐸(?̂?𝑡−1) =  𝜃𝑏 � 1−𝜃𝑏21−𝜃2𝑏2�       
 (9) 
and 
𝐸(?̂?𝑡−2) =  𝜃𝑏2 � 1−𝜃1−𝜃2𝑏2�        
 (10) 
6 
 
 
The structure of this process means that however many generations of ancestors 
are included, they will always statistically predict the wealth of the current 
generation.  Thus if we include great-grandparents and estimate 
  𝑤𝑡  =    𝛽𝑡−1𝑤𝑡−1  +   𝛽𝑡−2𝑤𝑡−2  + 𝛽𝑡−3𝑤𝑡−3 +   𝑣𝑡 
 (11) 
then the expected values of  𝛽𝑡−1, 𝛽𝑡−2, and 𝛽𝑡−3 are predicted to be 
 
𝐸(?̂?𝑡−1) =  𝜃𝑏 �1−𝜃𝑏2�1+𝜃−2𝜃𝑏2+𝑏2�1−𝜃2𝑏2[2−2𝜃𝑏2+𝑏2] �    
 (12) 
 
𝐸(?̂?𝑡−2) =  𝜃𝑏 � 𝑏[1−𝜃]�1−𝜃𝑏2�1−𝜃2𝑏2[2−2𝜃𝑏2+𝑏2]�     
 (13) 
 
𝐸(?̂?𝑡−3) =  𝜃𝑏 � 𝑏2[1−𝜃]21−𝜃2𝑏2[2−2𝜃𝑏2+𝑏2]�     
 (14) 
 
 We can use the data on individual linkages of fathers and their children to 
test whether the model we develop is consistent with the various observed 
intergenerational wealth elasticities. 
 
3.  The Data 
The data for this study consists of a database of estimated wealth at death 
for 21,618 English and Welsh men and women who died 1858-2012 aged 21 and 
above.  For each person we have gender, year of death, age at death, whether the 
person was probated or not, and if probated their estimated wealth at death.  For 
a subgroup of people, mainly men and unmarried women, we also can establish 
the identity of their father.  The men and women selected for inclusion in the 
database had one of 634 rare surnames, where 40 or fewer people held the 
surname at the time of the 1881 census.  By design these rare surnames were 
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chosen to oversample from the wealthy and the poor in the period 1858-87.  
Thus the variance of wealth in 1858-87 will be larger than for the population as a 
whole, but with social mobility over generations will decline towards the 
population variance by 2012. 
 
The rarity of the surnames allows us to trace the family connections of a 
substantial subgroup of those in the database using a variety of sources: the 
censuses of 1841-1911, birth records, marriage records, probate records, 
baptismal records, apprentice contracts, ship passenger lists, and newspaper 
announcements.6  The varieties of ways in which these sources record the same 
first names and surnames, and the mistakes from transcribing the handwriting of 
earlier documents, mean that this matching has to largely be done by hand.  Thus 
the name “Ernest Frederick Dilke” can appear in the records also as Ernest 
Dilke, Ernest F. Dilke, E. F. Dilke, Ernest Dilks, Ernest Duke, or Ernest Dilkes.7   
 
For England and Wales there are national birth and death registers 1837-
2012.  For deaths recorded 1867 and later, the death register records the age at 
death.  For 1858-1866 we estimated age at death where possible from birth 
records, or from census records of 1841, 1851 and 1861.  The England and 
Wales death register includes only people dying in England and Wales.  We 
supplemented the death register information with information on people dying 
abroad, or at sea.  This allows us to include men dying abroad in the Boer War, 
World War I, and World War II, as well as retirees dying abroad in Spain in more 
recent years.  
 
For each year 1858-2012 we have complete information on who was or was 
not probated, which is in itself an indicator of wealth at death.  Starting in 1858 
all probates in England and Wales were recorded at the Principal Probate 
Registry, and each estate was assigned a value for tax purposes.8  Only estates 
which exceeded a minimum value were required to be probated, and few are 
recorded probated under these minimums in any period.  We thus assume that 
anyone dying aged 21 and above who was not probated had an estate value half 
the minimum probate value at the time of their death, but with some exceptions 
explained in the appendix.   
                                                          
6 The matching by inspection of individuals across generations is extremely time 
consuming, so we have only attempted that for a quarter of the individuals in the sample. 
7 Ancestry.com has devised powerful software, however, that produces suggestions for 
any other records that might hold a record for a specific person looking at common 
transcription mistakes, common age of birth and birth location. 
8 This value related initially just to the “personalty” of the deceased, their assets exclusive 
of any real estate.  But it will still serve as an index of their overall wealth. 
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Since wealth at death has a very skewed distribution, we use the logarithm of 
estimated wealth to produce a distribution closer to normal.  Also since the 
nominal value of average wealth increased greatly between 1858 and 2012 we 
normalized by the estimated average wealth at death in each period.  We thus 
construct for each person i dying in year t a measure of normalized wealth at 
death which is 
 
𝑤𝑖𝑡 =  ln (𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡)  −   ln (𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑡)����������������     (15) 
 
where ln (𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑡)����������������  is the estimated average wealth at death, estimated from 
those dying with the surname Brown.  For each period 𝑤𝑖𝑡  will thus have an 
average expected value for the population as a whole of 0.  For the population as 
a whole the standard deviation of log wealth changed little over the years 1858-
2012, as is shown in table 1.  This means that the intergenerational elasticity of 
wealth will generally also be close for the population as a whole to the 
intergenerational correlation of wealth. 
 
In the years 1988-1998 the reported wealth measure was mainly limited to 2-
3 broad wealth bands and is not a good indicator of wealth.9  So we do not use 
the individual wealth data for these years, though we can use the information 
about what fraction of people were probated to estimate average wealth at death 
by surname group even in these years.  Table 1 gives a summary of the database.   
 
Common surnames in England varied little in average social status by 1800.10  
Rare surnames, however, did and do vary in status, and it is these we use to track 
elite and underclass groups across generations using this database.  In England, a 
significant fraction of surnames have always been rare.   Figure 1, for example, 
shows the share of the population holding surnames held by 50 people or less, 
for each frequency grouping, for the 1881 census of England.  The vagaries of 
spelling and transcribing handwriting mean that, particularly for many of the 
surnames in the 1-5 frequency range, this is just a recording or transcription 
                                                          
9 Thus in 1990 in our sample nearly two thirds of the probate values were reported as 
“not exceeding” £100,000 and “not exceeding” £115,000.  For 1981-87 when fewer 
probates had these value bands, and the so described limits were at the much lower 
levels of either £25,000 or £40,000, we replaced these values with an expected actual 
value for this range. This was the average of actual values for these years that fell below 
£25,000 and £40,000. 
10 When surnames were established in medieval England many were a marker of social 
status.  Slow but persistent social mobility, however, meant that by 1650 common 
surnames were of uniform average status.   
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error.  But for names in the frequency ranges 6-50, most will be genuine rare 
surnames.  Thus in England in 1881 5 percent of the population, 1.3 million 
people, held 92,000 such rare surnames.  
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Table 1:  Summary of the Data 
 
Period 
 
 
 
Deaths 
21+ 
 
 
Probates 
 
 
 
Average 
log 
wealth 
 
 
SD log 
wealth - 
rare 
names 
 
 
SD log 
wealth - 
populatio
n 
 
Father 
Known  
 
       
1858-1887 3,178 1,251 1.96 3.56 1.72 555 
1888-1917 3,746 1,349 1.23 3.13 1.81 856 
1918-1959 6,304 2,866 0.72 2.31 1.70 1,930 
1960-1993 5,467 2,282 0.43 1.83 1.40 996 
1994-2012 
 
2,923 
 
1,127 
 
0.39 
 
2.28 
 
1.97 
 
595 
 
 
Notes:  The table reports the mean and standard deviation of normalized log 
wealth for the population as a whole, and for the rare surname sample.  Years 
1988-1998 are excluded from the calculated means and standard deviations. 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Relative Frequency of Rare Surnames, 1881 Census, England 
 
Notes: From the transcribed 1881 census of England and Wales (Schurer and Woollard 2000). 
 
 
Such rare surnames arose in various ways: immigration of foreigners to 
England, such as the Huguenots after 1685 (Abauzit, Bazalgette, Bulteel, Du Cane), 
unusual spellings of more common surnames (Bigge, Bisshopp), or just names that 
were always held by very few people (Pepys, Binford, or Blacksmith).   
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Through two forces – the fact that many of those with rare names were 
related, and the operation of chance – the average social status of those with rare 
surnames varies greatly at any time.  We can thus divide people in any generation 
into constructed social and economic classes of rich, middling, and poor by 
focusing on those with rare surnames.  We will not often be able to discern 
exactly which later person with a surname was related to which earlier one.  But 
by treating everyone with the surname as one large family, we can follow families 
over many generations. We thus construct for 1858-1887 as a measure of the 
average wealth of each candidate surname k 
 
𝑤𝑘 =  1𝑛𝑘 ∑ 𝑙𝑛�𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑘𝑗�𝑛𝑘𝑗=1  −   ln (𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ)���������������    
 (16) 
 
where nk is the number of persons dying aged 21 and above for each surname k 
in these years.  We do this using deaths 1858-87, so that we have a long enough 
window with rare surnames to observe sufficient deaths to attribute reliably an 
average wealth to the surname. 
 
We divided our rare surnames into four types based on their average wealth 
at death 1858-87: two wealthier groups, the rich and the prosperous, and one 
poor group.  The rich were defined as those surnames where 𝑤𝑘 > 4 , the 
prosperous 4 > 𝑤𝑘 > 1.5 , the average 1.5 ≥ 𝑤𝑘 ≥  −0.3 , and the poor as 
𝑤𝑘 <  −0.3. 
 
We found candidate surnames for each group from a variety of sources.  For 
the rich and the prosperous surnames we had two lists of candidates.  First we 
looked in the years 1858-1861 at all probates of surnames beginning with the 
letters A-C held by 40 or fewer people in 1881, seeking those with substantial 
bequests that might be candidates to be rare surnames of high average wealth at 
death for the period 1858-1887.  This process proved time consuming and 
produced only 37 rich surnames, and 22 prosperous ones.  The second candidate 
source we had was a list of people who had died 1809-1839 leaving an estate of 
£100,000 or more from William Rubinstein.11  This produced a set of 68 rich rare 
surnames, and 54 prosperous rare surnames for deaths in the years 1858-1887.  
Thus the bulk of the samples of rich and prosperous surnames dying 1858-1887 
were identified by their surname wealth prior to 1840. 
                                                          
11 Rubinstein, 2009. 
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As candidates for the poor surnames we checked the probate records for 
rare surnames from two sources: a list of habitual paupers in 1861, and lists of 
the criminally indicted in London and Essex 1860-2.  The appendix lists the 
details of these sources.  Because in the period 1858-87 only 15% of adults were 
probated at death it proved actually difficult using average probate values to 
identify truly poor surnames.  So most of the identification of the 
intergenerational elasticity of wealth, below, comes from the richer samples. 
 
 Table 2 lists the first 15 surnames alphabetically in each group.  The 
complete listing is given in the appendix.  The important point here is that there 
is nothing in most of these surnames that signals their social status.  Though 
there are a few of the rich surnames that would potentially signal great wealth – 
Rothschild, for example - most of the surnames themselves are neutral markers, 
not having any effects on outcomes.  It is also important that no information 
about their status in years later than 1887 was used to assign surnames to the 
initial wealth type.  
 
By design these surnames oversample the extremes of the wealth 
distribution in 1858-1887.  However, even the surnames classified as rich or 
prosperous cover a wide range of wealth at death, particularly as we move to the 
second and later generations and wealth regresses towards the mean.  Figure 2, 
for example, shows the location of the average log wealth of the rich and prosperous 
surnames in the overall distribution of log wealth, as represented by the Brown 
surname.  By the fourth generation both of these richer surname types have 
average wealth that falls below the 80th percentile of all deceased.  Thus within 
even these richer surname groupings there are many people dying with modest or 
no assets. 
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Table 2:  The Rare Surname Groups, 1858-1887 
 
Rich 
 
Prosperous 
 
Poor 
   
Ahmuty Agace Adson 
Angerstein Agar-Ellis Aller 
Appold Aglen Almand 
Auriol Allecock Angler 
Bailward Aloof Anglim 
Basevi Alsager Annings 
Bazalgette Bagnold Austell 
Beague Beridge Backlake 
Benthall Berthon Bagwill 
Berens Brettingham Balsden 
Berners Brideoake Banbrook 
Bigge Broadmead Bantham 
Blegborough Broderip Bawson 
Blicke Brouncker Beetchenow 
Boger Brune Bemmer 
   
 
 
Figure 2:  Location by Wealth Percentiles, Surname Types, by Generation  
 
Note:  See appendix for details of this calculation. 
 
Table 3 gives a summary of the data by death generations.  Since we have 
measures of wealth at death, and average age of death was increasing, to get 
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cohorts of close to 30 years difference in average birth dates we have to have 
death cohorts that are longer than 30 years.  These are thus 1888-1917, 1918-
1959, 1960-1993, and 1994-2011, producing average dates of birth for the adults 
in these death cohorts of 1815, 1843, 1872, 1902, and 1925.  There are declining 
numbers of surnames in the sample over time because rare surnames tend to die 
out due to the vagaries of fertility and mortality.12   
Table 4 and figure 3 show the probate rates of the rich, prosperous and poor 
surnames by death cohort, for those dying 21 and older.  Also shown are overall 
average probate rates.  There are large differences in probate rates in the first 
generation.  These differences narrow over the death cohorts.  But even by 1994-
2011 probate rates for the richest surname group are still 0.61, compared to an 
average for England of 0.43.  Thus four generations later descendants of the rich 
and prosperous surname groups born circa 1815 are still by implication 
significantly wealthier than the average person dying in England.  
Figure 4 shows the average log probate values for each surname group, for 
those probated, by period relative to the value of all probates for those probated, 
omitting 1988-98.   The probate values of all the surname groups approach 
average probate values for England, but again the probate values of the two 
richer groups remain significantly above average values in 1999-2011.  Finally 
table 5 and figure 5 combines the information in figures 3 and 4 to produce an 
estimate of the average log wealth at death of the rich and poor surname groups 
by death cohort, minus the average log wealth of all deceased. 
Figure 5 shows that for each surname group average wealth is converging to 
the social mean across generations, but at very slow rates.  Also the rate of 
convergence does not appear to be greater in recent generations.  Average wealth 
at death in 1999-2011 for the rich group of 1858-87 is still 3.6 times average 
wealth at death for all deceased.  Yet the earliest cohorts were born in an era of 
limited public schooling and limited taxation, and the last in an era of public 
provision of education and extensive taxation and redistribution.  
 
Table 3: Summary of the Surname Samples 
    
                                                          
12 Since the death register index 1858-1865 does not record age at death, for these 
years we estimated age at death where possible from age reports in the 1861, 1851, and 
1841 censuses, as well as from the birth register 1837-1865. 
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Period Surnames Probates Deaths 21+ 
 
 
WEALTHIER 
  
1858-87 181 1,141 1,737* 
1888-1917 172 1,143 1,842 
1918-1959 169 1,935 2,825 
1960-1993 154 1,102 1,700 
1994-2012 139 454 766 
    
POORER   
1858-87 229 23 1,156* 
1888-1917 202 172 1,380 
1918-1959 206 587 2,423 
1960-1993 204 912 2,694 
1994-2012 
 
166 541 1,306 
Notes: All surnames were held by 40 or fewer people in the 1881 census. Deaths are from 
the General Registry Office (See References section). * Where age was unknown 1858-
65 (97 and 363 cases), the fraction above 21 was estimated from the 1866-87 ratio of 
deaths 21+ to all deaths. 
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Table 4: Proportion Probated by Surname Group 
 
Period 
 
 
Average 
Birth 
Year 
 
 
Rich 
 
 
Prosperous 
 
 
Poor 
 
 
All Deaths 
 
      
1858-1887 1815 0.83 0.56 0.02 0.15 
1888-1917 1843 0.66 0.53 0.11 0.22 
1918-1959 1872 0.73 0.63 0.24 0.40 
1960-1993 1902 0.68 0.63 0.33 0.46 
1994-2012 1925 0.61 0.58 0.39 0.43 
      
 
Figure 3: Probate Rates of Surname Types, by generation 
 
Notes: The probate rate in a given generation is the number of people recorded in the probate 
registry divided by the number of people dying. (Source: Principal Probate Registry and GRO.)  
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Figure 4: Average Ln Probate Wealth, those probated, by generation 
 
Notes: Ln probate wealth by surname is measured as average ln wealth by surname minus the 
estimated overall average ln probate wealth (from the Brown surname).  
 
 
 
Table 5:  Average ln Wealth, all Adult Deaths, by Death Generations 
 
Generation 
 
 
Rich 
 
Prosperous 
 
Poorer 
    
1858-1887 5.23 3.04 -0.64 
1888-1917 3.31 2.47 -0.43 
1918-1952 2.28 1.66 -0.44 
1953-1987 1.67 1.22 -0.10 
1999-2011 
 
1.34 
 
1.06 
 
-0.11 
 
Notes: Wealth is measured relative to estimated average wealth. Those not probated are assigned 
an imputed wealth as described in the text.  The years 1988-1998 are omitted for the reasons 
described in the text. 
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Figure 5: Average Log Probate Value, Including Those Not Probated, by 
Generation 
  
Source:  Table 3. 
 
 
4. Intergenerational Elasticity Estimates 
We use the data on wealth at death described above to estimate the 
intergenerational elasticity of wealth across the years 1858-2012 in England in 
two ways.  The first is the conventional method where we use the links between 
fathers and their sons and unmarried daughters to estimate the intergenerational 
elasticity by estimating the β in the expression 
   𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡+1  =   𝛼 +  𝛽𝑤𝑗𝑡  +  𝛿𝐷𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑗 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡     
 (17) 
where j indexes the fathers, and i the children of father j, for children dying in the 
five periods 1858-87, 1888-1917, 1918-1959, 1960-1993, and 1994-2012.   We 
include the indicator variable DFEM which is 1 when the child is a daughter, 0 
otherwise.  This indicator is statistically significant and negative in all periods.   
This estimation itself provides interesting information on rates of wealth 
mobility in England across very different social regimes, running from Victorian 
times to the present.  The estimates here are shown in table 6, averaging 0.43.  
They are very reasonable in the light of the limited evidence found elsewhere on 
wealth  
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Table 6:  Conventional Estimates of Intergenerational Wealth Elasticities, 
1858-2012 
 
 
Period of 
child death 
 
 
ALL 
N 
 
ALL 
?̂? 
 
Father 
Probated, 
N 
 
Father 
Probated 
?̂? 
     
1858-87 154 0.388 
(0.065) 
98 0.393 
(0.154) 
1888-1917 657 0.479 
(0.033) 
392 0.611 
(0.068) 
1918-59 1,696 0.414 
(0.018) 
945 0.525 
(0.038) 
1960-87 884 0.409 
(0.025) 
435 0.421 
(0.039) 
1999-2012 383 0.460 
(0.061) 
157 0.559 
(.101) 
     
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
mobility across generations.  They are also surprisingly stable over time.  There is 
modest sign in the data of any increasing wealth mobility in recent generations.13  
We take the wealth of fathers only, even though in many cases we know also the 
mothers, because in England before 1882 all the property of wives was subsumed 
in their husband’s estate. 
 Table 4 shows that probate rates before 1930 were generally low, so that we 
are assigning to many fathers and children in estimating the coefficients in (15) an 
imputed wealth, particularly in the earlier periods.  Such imputation can bias the 
estimate of β both downwards (when it applies to the fathers), and upwards when 
the same imputation is made for both father and child.  Table 4 also shows the 
estimation results where to limit the amount of imputation we consider only 
                                                          
13 In line with this, Long, 2013, found that occupation mobility rates in England in 1881 
and 1911 were similar to those of 1972. 
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fathers who were probated.   This raises the average estimated elasticity to 0.50, 
but again with no sign of any decline in elasticity for the most recent generations. 
 Using surname groupings we derive an alternative estimate of the 
intergenerational elasticity of wealth by measuring the rate of movement of 
wealth among rich, prosperous and poor surname groups towards average 
wealth.  Thus we calculate  
𝛽𝐴 =  𝑤�𝑖𝑘𝑡+1𝑤�𝑖𝑘𝑡         
(6) 
Table 7 shows these estimates by period, and the average across four generations.  
Also shown are bootstrapped standard errors.14  What is striking in table 7 are the 
high estimated values for the intergenerational elasticity of wealth, estimated in 
this way.  For the rich group this averages 0.71, for the prosperous group 0.77, 
and for the poor group, 0.64.  For the richer groups the standard errors on these 
estimates are low up until the last period.  They show that we can be confident 
the intergenerational elasticity on average was above 0.7.  But the standard errors 
are higher for the poor group, since their average wealth is closer to the social 
average, and βA is estimated as the ratio of two numbers.  By the time we get to 
the last generation, the standard error on the poor group is so high that there is 
no information in this estimate.  
If we combine both higher wealth groups, the average βA for those is 0.74, 
and now the estimated βA across all generations is 0.69-0.83.  It is also striking 
that there is no sign of any gain in wealth mobility over time.  Wealth is as closely 
connected to previous generations for those dying 1999-2011 as it was in 
previous generations. 
It is clear that this high persistence of wealth is occurring across a broad 
range of the wealth distribution.  The average βA for the prosperous group is 
higher even than for those initially very wealthy.  And as both rich groups move 
towards the mean wealth in later generations, the βA does not decline.   
   
Table 7:   Wealth Elasticities between Death Generations 
 
Year of Death 
 
Rich 
 
Prosperous 
 
Rich/ 
 
Poor 
                                                          
14 If b is indeed the ratio of two normally distributed variables, it would not possess an 
expected value or a variance.  However, in practice when we bootstrapped b over many 
thousands of iterations, its value was always defined. 
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 Prosperous 
 
     
1888-1917 0.63 
(0.026) 
 
0.81 
(0.051) 
 
0.71 
(0.026) 
 
0.67 
(0.059) 
 
1918-1959 0.69 
(0.032) 
 
0.67 
(0.042) 
 
0.69 
(0.026) 
 
1.02 
(0.105) 
 
1960-1987 0.73 
(0.043) 
 
0.73 
(0.053) 
 
0.73 
(0.033) 
 
0.23 
(.069) 
 
1999-2012 0.80 
(0.095) 
 
0.87 
(0.123) 
 
0.83 
(0.074) 
 
1.10 
(1.596) 
 
     
Average 0.71 
(0.020) 
 
0.77 
(0.026) 
0.74 
(0.016) 
0.64 
(0.129) 
 
Notes:  Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.   
      
 
As before, in the estimates in table 6 we have to impute probate values for 
large numbers of people whose estates were not probated.  Could this imputation 
be the source of the surprising persistence in table 7?  We saw with the individual 
estimates that it does make a modest difference to the estimated intergenerational 
correlation if we use only fathers whose wealth is not imputed, though in that 
case it increases the estimated elasticity.   However, once we group people by 
surnames into hundreds in each generation to estimate βA then the imputation 
has inconsequential effects on the estimate.  Given that on average we are 
imputing the probate values for 530 people in each surname category per 
generation, even if we had the exact values of wealth for all those not probated 
these would average out in such a grouping close to the imputed values. 
However, as a check it is possible to also estimate βA just from the 
proportion of people probated in each generation in each surname group, 
without having to make these imputations.  Suppose we assume 𝑤𝑖 ~ 𝑁(0,𝜎2), 
and also that only the top x% of those in the wealth distribution are probated.  
This is the situation shown in figure 6.  The richer groups are assumed to be 
probated at a higher rate because their wealth distributions are rightward shifted 
compared to the population distribution. 
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The overrepresentation of surname group k among the probated in 1858-87 
could be produced by a range of values for the initial mean wealth of this group, 
𝑤�𝑘0, and the variance for the group, 𝜎𝑘02 .  But for any assumption about (𝑤�𝑘0, 
𝜎𝑘0
2 ) the change in the share probated in the next generation will imply a value 
for βA.  This is because 
    𝑤�𝑘𝑡+1  =   𝛽𝐴𝑤�𝑘𝑡        
 (18) and     𝜎𝑘𝑡+12 =  𝛽𝐴2𝜎𝑘𝑡2  +  (1 − 𝛽𝐴2)𝜎2   
  (19) 
We assume the variance of 𝑤𝑖 for the surname groups is the same as for the 
general population.  We do this because, as figure 7 shows, the variance of wealth 
for those probated, whose wealth can be observed, is even greater than the 
variance for the general population, represented by the surname Brown.  Then we 
calculate from the change in share probated in each period, compared to the 
population share probated, what the implied βA is for each group in each period, 
just from how much shift downwards of the mean would be required to increase 
the share probated in the way observed.  Alternative assumptions about the initial 
variance of 𝑤𝑖 for each surname group has little effect on the estimates of βA. 
Table 8 shows the results.  The fitted βA is most stable for the rich, the 
group whose probate rates differ most from the average.  It is most noisy for the 
poor, whose probate rates are closest to the average.  But overall there is a 
remarkable similarity between the average wealth elasticity βA estimated in this 
way for each surname group, and the earlier estimates of table 7, as table 8 shows.  
There is again no sign, looking at the rich and the prosperous surnames, that 
regression to the mean measured by probate rates is any faster in the current 
generation than it was in earlier generations.   
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Figure 6: Regression to the Mean of Elite Surnames 
 
 
Figure 7:  Wealth Distribution, Rich, Prosperous and Brown Surnames, 
1918-1959
 
Table 8:  Intergenerational Wealth Elasticity Estimated from the 
Proportions Probated 
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Period 
 
Rich 
 
Prosperous 
 
Rich and 
Prosperous 
 
Poor 
 
     
1888-1917 0.60 
(0.027) 
 
0.73 
(0.045) 
0.68 
(0.025) 
0.43 
(0.048) 
1918-1959 0.74 
(0.039) 
 
0.70 
(0.040) 
0.72 
(0.032) 
0.98 
(0.122) 
1960-1993 0.66 
(0.059) 
 
0.74 
(0.080) 
0.69 
(0.031) 
0.74 
(0.074) 
1994-2012a 0.73 
(0.152) 
 
0.81 
(0.189) 
0.77 
(0.093) 
0.22 
(0.092) 
     
Average by 
group 
 
0.68 
(0.026) 
 
0.74 
(0.029) 
 
 
0.71 
(0.019) 
 
 
0.54 
(0.025) 
 
Average 
from table 5 
0.71 
 
0.77 
 
0.74 
 
0.64 
 
     
Notes:  aAdjusting b estimate down for shorter interval between average date of 
birth in this period.  Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.   
 
 
The estimate of βA is not sensitive to the assumed initial variance of 𝑤𝑖 
among the surname groups.  For the rich if we assumed a variance initially 3 
times the population variance then ?̂?𝐴 would have been overall 0.64 instead of 
0.68.  If we assumed an initial variance of 𝑤𝑖 one third that of the population, 
then ?̂?𝐴  would be 0.72.  For the last period these initial assumptions about 
variance have even less effect.  Now ?̂?𝐴 would range from 0.73 to 0.77.  So just 
looking at the share probated supports the conclusion of very slow regression to 
the mean, even in the most recent period.  
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In the methods section we proposed an explanation of these very different 
rates of regression to the mean for surname groups than for individual families, 
which was the structure given in equations (3) and (4).  This is that there is an 
underlying constant slow rate of regression for a latent variable of overall social 
competence for families.  This social competence is linked to any particular 
aspect of social status only with a random component.  We showed there that 
this explanation has testable implications for the wealth elasticity that would be 
predicted between grandchildren and grandchildren, and great-grandchildren and 
great grandchildren, controlling or not controlling for other ancestors.   
 
 Table 9 reports the estimates of these various coefficients, and the predicted 
level of these coefficients if there is an underlying regression to the mean of a 
generalized social status of 0.72.  Columns three and four show the estimated 
bivariate wealth elasticities between grandparents and grandchildren, and great-
grandchildren and great grandchildren.  Also shown in square brackets are the 
implied values, if there was an underlying Markov process of regression to the 
mean with b = 0.72, as would be indicated by the surname estimations.   In both 
cases the estimates are close to those implied by such a process. 
 
 Columns 5 and 6 show the estimated multivariate intergenerational wealth 
elasticities once we include grandfathers, and grandfathers and great-grandfathers 
also.  Again the values predicted by equations (3) and (4) as a description of the 
wealth mobility process are close to those observed.  Only the coefficient on the 
wealth of fathers is statistically significantly different from what would be 
predicted. 
 
 The fact that even controlling for the wealth of fathers and grandfathers, the 
wealth of great-grandfathers is predictive of child wealth is interesting.  Great-
grandfathers will not have been alive at the same time as their great-
grandchildren.  So they were unlikely to play any direct role, not mediated by 
grandparents and parents, in the wealth acquired by these great-grandchildren at 
the ends of their lives.  In this model their wealth is correlated with that of their 
great-grandchildren, even controlling for the wealth of fathers and grandfathers, 
simply because it provides more information on what the underlying social status 
of fathers and grandfathers is, that underlying status being what influences the 
wealth of the current generation. 
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Table 9:  Intergenerational Elasticities of Wealth in England, 1858-2012 
 
Dependent 
Variable ln 
Wealth of..  
 
 
Sons/ 
Daughter
s 
 
 
Grandsons
/ 
Daughters 
  
 
Great 
Grandsons
/ 
Daughters 
 
 
 
Grandsons
/ 
Daughters 
 
 
Great 
Grandsons
/ 
daughters 
 
            
LnWealth 
Fathers 
0.431 
(.014) 
 - - 
 
0.289 
(.034) 
0.252 
(.063) 
      [.364] [.356] 
        
LnWealth 
Grandfather
s 
 - 0.294 
(.021) 
- 
 
0.137 
(.028) 
0.107 
(.051) 
    [.310]  [.153] [.133] 
        
LnWealth 
Great 
Grandfather
s 
 - - 
 
0.255 
(.033) 
[.232] 
- 
 
0.089 
(.041) 
[.056] 
        
        
Observation
s 
3,872 1,384 360 1,370 339 
R-squared 0.33 0.23 0.19 0.32 0.28 
            
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.   [ ] indicates predicted values 
based on constant underlying b of 0.72. 
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5.  Interpretation 
We see three striking facts in the data presented above.  The first is that the 
elasticity of wealth across single generations is substantially greater for people 
grouped into surname cohorts than it is for individual families.  The second is 
that the elasticity of wealth across generations has changed little either at the 
individual or the group level between 1858 and 2012, despite the enormous 
changes of these years.  The third fact is that the elasticity of wealth in individual 
families and for surname groupings between children and grandparents and 
great-grandparents is surprisingly strong.15   We posit a simple model to explain 
this, where there is an underlying social status of families regressing only slowly 
to the social mean, and show that it accords well with the data. 
 
 The constancy of the rate of regression of wealth to the social mean across 
these five generations is a surprise.  The earlier generation held wealth in an era 
where income and wealth taxation was very modest, and the current generation 
holds wealth in an era where there has been considerable taxation of both income 
and wealth.  The maximum inheritance tax rate in England for those dying 1858-
1887 was 4.1 percent.  Thus these families could pass on wealth almost intact to 
their heirs dying 1888-1917.  In contrast for those dying in the generation 1960-
1993, the maximum inheritance tax averaged 69 percent, as figure 8 illustrates.  
The rich of the generation dying 1999-2012 thus would have faced substantial 
confiscation by government of any transfers from the previous generation.  This 
should have pushed their wealth much more quickly towards the mean than was 
happening before.  Yet we do not see this in the data.  The persistence of wealth 
remained just as high for the last two heavily taxed generations as for the 
previous two that mainly escaped inheritance taxation. 
 
Aside from direct taxation of wealth there have been other changes since 
1858 that would seem to create greater wealth mobility.  There has been, for 
example, since 1870 a vast expansion of state provision for education.  Only in 
1880 did England introduce compulsory primary school attendance, to age 10.  
Over time the school leaving age was progressively extended:  11 in 1893, 12 in 
1899, and 14 in 1918.  Thus the first two generations in our study, those born on 
average in 1815 and  
Figure 8: Maximum Inheritance Tax Rates, UK, 1825-2012 
                                                          
15 Recent studies report the same surprisingly strong links across multiple generations for 
wealth in Denmark (Boserup et al., 2013), education and earnings in Sweden (Lindahl et 
al., 2012), and occupations in England and the USA (Long and Ferrie, 2012). 
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1843, grew up in a society with no public provision for schooling, and no 
requirement that parents educate children.  The last generation, born on average 
in 1925, lived in a society where the state provided education to all to age 14.  Yet 
none of these changes seem to have affected the intergenerational elasticity of 
wealth. 
 
 One implication of the structure we have identified underlying the 
inheritance of wealth is that if we look at groups of people identified by race, 
religion or ethnicity, then these groups will see wealth regress to the mean at a 
much slower rate than that observed for individual families.   For such groupings 
the transitory components in wealth will on average be zero, and will thus not 
affect the measured intergenerational elasticities, which will depend only on the 
underlying component.  So for racial, religious and ethnic groups we would 
expect to see an intergenerational elasticity of wealth at death of 0.7 or greater. 
      
 What is the nature of the underlying latent variable which seemingly governs 
the inheritance of wealth in the same way over five generations?   There is 
evidence from these same surnames, that we do not detail here, that the 
underlying latent variable is the generalized social competence of these families, 
which is regressing only slowly to the mean.  Thus if we take any measure of 
socio-economic status for these same rare surnames in the years 1800-2012 – 
educational attainment, longevity, occupational attainment, for example – we 
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observe the same underlying high rate of persistence.  One measure of 
educational attainment for these surnames, for example, is their rate of 
occurrence at Oxford and Cambridge 1830-2012.  Though the rich and 
prosperous surnames were categorized purely by their average wealth at death 
1858-1887, they are heavily overrepresented at Oxford and Cambridge 1830-59.  
From 1860 to 2012 their overrepresentation at Oxford and Cambridge has 
declined, but still in 2010-2012, six generations later, they occur at a higher than 
expected rate.  The decline in their representation at these universities can again 
be modeled as a simple Markov process in an underlying latent variable of social 
competence with a persistence of around 0.73.16  Wealth mobility and educational 
mobility for these families is remarkably similar in the years 1858-2012.   Again 
this constancy in the character of mobility occurs at a time of great change in the 
nature of Oxford and Cambridge as educational institutions in terms of how they 
selected students and how students were funded. 
 
 The evidence that other aspects of social status are governed by very similar 
processes as wealth at death implies that the conventional studies of social 
mobility, which look just at the inheritance of one aspect of status, will 
overestimate the overall rate of social mobility if we look at the status of families 
on an aggregate of characteristics – earnings, wealth, education, occupation, and 
health.  With such an aggregate measure the rate of persistence, even in one 
generation, will be much closer to that of the underlying latent variable. 
 
Conclusions 
 Utilizing a newly constructed data set we are able to observe the inheritance 
of wealth over 5 generations in England, for people dying between 1858 and 
2012.  The data set was constructed to include everyone dying with a set of rare 
surnames identified as rich or poor based on average wealth at death 1858-1887.  
This structure allows us to measure social mobility in two ways.  The first is the 
conventional measure of the intergenerational elasticity of wealth between fathers 
and children.  These estimates, at 0.43-0.50, fall within the expected range, but 
are also surprisingly stable over 5 generations from 1858-2012.  But the rare 
surnames also allow us to measure intergenerational wealth mobility by looking at 
people grouped by the initial average wealth of their surnames.  Using such 
groupings the estimated intergenerational elasticity is much higher, in the range 
of 0.7, and again is stable over the period 1858-2012.   
                                                          
16 Clark and Cummins, 2013. 
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 We show that these two sets of estimates can be reconciled by positing a 
simple latent variable model of the inheritance of wealth with an underlying AR1 
process.  This model has testable implications for what the observed wealth 
elasticities will be between grandparents and grandchildren, and great 
grandparents and great grandchildren.  We show that the observed elasticities in 
our database are close to the predicted.     
 The implications of this model are that wealth will be surprisingly persistent 
in families across multiple generations.  This is what allows rich rare surnames to 
still remain rich on average even four generations later.  It also implies that 
wealth differences between racial, religious and ethnic groups will also be highly 
persistent across generations. 
 What is the latent variable that underlies the inheritance of wealth?  
Evidence in other work we have done on the inheritance of education status in 
England suggests that families can be conceived of as having an underlying social 
competence, which is highly persistent across generations.  This social 
competence generates their outcomes on all dimensions of social status, but with 
random components on each one.  In this case social mobility between 
generations measured on any single aspect of status will be much greater than 
mobility on a more general ranking of families’ overall social status, that averages 
earnings, wealth, occupation, education, health and longevity. 
 
  
 
 
  
31 
 
Data Sources 
Wealth:  
 
England and Wales, Index to Wills and Administrations, 1858-2012.  Principal Probate 
registry, London (available online 1858-1966 at Ancestry.co.uk). 
Prerogative Court of Canterbury and Related Probate Jurisdictions: Probate Act Books. 
Volumes: 1850-57. Held at the National Archives, Kew. (Catalogue Reference: 
PROB 8/243-250.) 
 
Births and Deaths:  
 
General Register Office. England and Wales Civil Registration Indexes. London, 
England: General Register Office. 
 
Online Sources: 
FreeBMD. England & Wales, FreeBMD Death Index: 1837-1915 [database on-line]. 
Provo, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations Inc, 2006. 
FreeBMD. England & Wales, FreeBMD Birth Index, 1837-1915 [database on-line]. 
Provo, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations Inc, 2006. 
Ancestry.com. England & Wales, Birth Index: 1916-2005 [database on-line]. Provo, 
UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations Inc, 2008. 
Ancestry.com. England & Wales, Death Index: 1916-2006 [database on-line]. Provo, 
UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations Inc, 2007. 
 
Births post 2005 and deaths post 2006 were collected from the London 
Metropolitan Archives. 
 
 
Others: 
 
Calendars of Prisoners, 1860-9.  Calendars of prisoners for Essex Quarter Sessions, 
Essex Assizes and Special Sessions of Gaol Delivery.  Essex Record Office, 
Q/SMC 9. 
 England and Wales, Censuses, 1841-1901.  Available online at 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/records/census-records.htm 
Office for National Statistics, Surnames. Available online at http://www.taliesin-
arlein.net/names/search.php 
Proceedings of the Old Bailey, 1674-1913.  Available at 
http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/ 
32 
 
Schurer, Kevin and Woollard, Matthew, 1881 Census for England and Wales, the 
Channel Islands and the Isle of Man (Enhanced Version) [computer file]. 
Genealogical Society of Utah, Federation of Family History Societies, [original 
data producer(s)]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 2000. SN: 
4177, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-4177-1 
UK, House of Commons Papers.  1861.  Paupers in workhouses.   Returns from each 
workhouse in England and Wales, of the name of every adult pauper who has been an inmate 
of the workhouse during a continuous period of five years.  Vol LV, 201.  Cmd.  490. 
 
 
 
References 
 
Boserup, Simon Halphen, Wojciech Kopczuk, and Claus Thustrup 
Kreiner.  2013.  “Intergenerational Wealth Mobility: Evidence from Danish 
Wealth Records of Three Generations.”  Working Paper, University of 
Copenhagen. 
Clark, Greg and Neil Cummins. 2013. “Surnames and Social Mobility.” Mimeo. 
Available at www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gclark/ and 
www.neilcummins.com. 
Dearden, Lorraine, Stephen Machin and Howard Reed. 1997. "Intergenerational 
mobility in Britain." Economic Journal, 107: 47-66. 
Harbury, C. D. and Hitchens, D. M. W. N.  1979.  Inheritance and Wealth Inequality 
in Britain.  London: Allen and Unwin. 
Lindahl, Mikael, Mårten Palme, Sofia Sandgren Massih, Anna Sjögren. 2012. “Th
e Intergenerational Persistence of Human Capital: an Empirical Analysis of F
ourGenerations” Working Paper, IFAU, Uppsala University. 
Long, Jason.  2013.  “The Surprising Social Mobility of Victorian Britain.” 
European Review of Economic History, 17(1): 1-23. 
Long, Jason and Joseph Ferrie.  2012.  “Grandfathers Matter(ed): Occupational 
Mobiility Across Three Generations in the U.S. and Britain, 1850-1910.”  
Working Paper. 
Nicoletti, Cheti and John Ermisch.  2007. “Intergenerational earnings mobility: 
Changes across cohorts in Britain”, B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 
7, Article 9. 
Rubinstein, William D.  2009.  Who Were the Rich?  A Biographical Directory of British 
Wealth-Holders.  Volume One, 1809-1839.   London: Social Affairs Unit. 
Turner, John D.  2010.  “Wealth concentration in the European periphery: 
Ireland, 1858–2001.”  Oxford Economic Papers, 62: 625-646. 
33 
 
 
 
  
34 
 
Appendix 
 
Construction of the Surname Samples 
  
Rare surname samples were created from surnames held by 40 or less people 
in 1881, where there was at least one adult death in 1858-1887.  Surnames were 
designated as rich, prosperous, or poor based on the log average wealth at death, 
estimated as personalty, of all those 21 and above with a surname dying in these 
30 years.  Personalty is all property other than real estate.  In this period on 
average only 15 percent of adults in England had their estates probated after 
death.  The value of the other 85 percent mostly fell below the minimum estate 
value of £10 at which probate was required.  Thus table A1 shows the numbers 
and distribution of probate values in 1858 compared to all deaths aged 21 and 
above, from the report of the Registrar General. 
 
 Since nominal values of probates were changing over time with economic 
growth, and later with inflation, we normalize these values throughout by 
calculating for each probate the logarithm of its value minus the logarithm of the 
average probate value for the population as a whole in that quinquennia.   For 
1858 we know the overall distribution of probate values in England and Wales.  
Table A1 shows these.  For later years we estimated this distribution using 
samples of the probate values for the common surname Brown.   
 
For those not probated we have to attribute a probate value.  In each period 
there was a minimum estate value at which probate was legally required: £10 
(1858-1900), £50 (1901-1930), £50-500 (1931-1965), £500 (1965-1974), £1,500 
(1975-1983), and £5,000 (1984-2011) (Turner, 2010, 628).  We thus took as the 
value of estate for those not probated as typically half the minimum requiring 
probate: £5 (1858-1900), £10 (1901-9), £15 (1910-019), £20 (1920-30), £25 
(1931-9), £50 (1940-9), £100 (1950-9), £250 (1960-1974), £750 (1975-1983), and 
£2,500 (1984-2011).  We did not increase the attributed value in 1901 to £25 
because the rise in the probate limit to £50 in that year had little effect on the 
implied value of the omitted probates in 1901 compared to 1900.  Thus whatever 
the exact cutoff the bulk of the omitted probates were closer to 0 in value than to 
£50. 
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Table A1:  Probates 1858, England and Wales  
 
Wealth (less 
than) £ 
 
 
Number of 
probates 
 
Proportion of adult 
deaths 
   
- - 0.8584 
10 1,935 0.0091 
60 6,368 0.0301 
200 7,182 0.0339 
450 4,303 0.0203 
800 2,725 0.0129 
1,500 2,671 0.0126 
3,000 2,058 0.0097 
5,000 806 0.0038 
7,000 439 0.0021 
9,000 303 0.0014 
15,000 602 0.0028 
25,000 231 0.0011 
40,000 187 0.0009 
75,000 102 0.0005 
100,000* 67 0.0003 
   
Notes: *Personal estates of £100,000 and above. 
 
 
 
We identified candidate rare surnames in a number of ways.  For the rich 
and prosperous samples we checked the probate records in 1858-61 looking for 
rare surnames with high probate values.  We also checked rare surnames from 
Rubinstein’s list of the very rich dying 1810-1839 (Rubinstein, 2009).  To identify 
the poor surnames we checked the probate records for rare surnames from three 
sources.  First there was the 1861 list of paupers who had been in workhouses 
across England and Wales for at least 5 years, issued by Parliament.  Then there 
were people convicted of crimes in Essex courts 1860-1862.  Finally there were 
those convicted of crimes in the Old Bailey in London in these same years. 
 
 For 1858-1887 deaths, rare surnames were classified in one of three groups 
based on the average value of the log of wealth.   
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Rich:  The rich group is surnames with average ln of probate values in these 
years of 6.3 or above.  This corresponds to the top 5% of wealth for individual 
probate values in 1858 in table A1.  This group includes some distinguished 
baronial surnames, such as Leveson-Gower.  But there are also surnames such as 
Clarke-Jervoise where the largest probate value in the period was £4,000, below 
even the top 1% of wealth at death in 1858. 
 
The list of these surnames is: Ahmuty, Allecock, Angerstein, Appold, Auriol, 
Bailward, Basevi, Bazalgette, Beague, Berens, Beridge, Berners, Bigge, 
Blegborough, Blicke, Boger, Bouwens, Braikenridge, Brightwen, Brudenell-Bruce, 
Brunel, Bulteel, Burmester, Burrard, Buttanshaw, Cankrien, Carbonell, Cazalet, 
Cazenove, Champion-De Crespigny, Clagett, Claypon, Cleoburey, Coape, Colfox, 
Colvile, Conduitt, Conyngham, Cornwallis, Coryton, Cotesworth, Courtauld, 
Crokat, Daubuz, D'aubuz, De Gatacre, De Lousada, Du Cane, Elmsall, Fector, 
Fludyer, Garle, Gatacre, Gaussen, Haldimand, Haselfoot, Hilhouse, Holbech, 
Hugonin, Jervoise, Knowlys, Labouchere, Lane-Fox, Legrew, Leschallas, 
Leveson-Gower, Loddiges, Lousada, Lucena, Lutyens, Marryat, Merceron, Meux, 
Micklethwait, Montefiore, Morier, Musters, Oglander, Orred, Papillon, Penoyre, 
Penrhyn, Perigal, Puget, Pulteney, Roupell, Rushout, Skipwith, Sotheby, 
Strangways, Streatfeild, Taddy, Thoroton, Trebeck, Trelawny, Tunno, Usticke, 
Vansittart, Watlington, Weguelin, Willoughby De Broke, Willyams. 
 
Prosperous: The second group of surnames is designated “prosperous” 
since surnames with an average personalty at death as low as £45 in 1858-87, 
close to the estimated average annual wage, would qualify for inclusion in this 
group.  In terms of individual probates this corresponds to the next 6% of the 
population dying 1858. 
 
The list of these surnames is:  Agace, Agar-Ellis, glen, Aloof, Alsager, 
Bagnold, Benthall, Berthon, Brandram, Brettingham, Brideoake, Broadmead, 
Broderip, Brouncker, Brune, Calrow, Champernowne, Chaplyn, Chatteris, 
Cludde, Cookney, Cothay, Creyke, Croasdaile, Cruso, Cruttwell, Daukes, De 
Grey, Dilke, Du Boulay, Faulconer, Favre, Filder, Goodford, Goodhart, 
Grazebrook, Greame, Grimshawe, Hecker, Heneage, Hetley, Hollwey, Jeakes, 
Lamotte, Lechmere, Leir, Leycester, Lillingston, Linzee, Lombe, Magenis, 
Manners-Sutton, Merewether, Methold, Mildmay, Minet, Monins, Nedham, 
Nottidge, Novelli, Oliverson, Pepys, Perryn, Pickmere, Pigou, Poulett, Proby, 
Reynardson, Rothschild, Rusbridger, Sapte, Senhouse, Severne, Sich, Teissier, 
Thellusson, Thoyts, Tyssen, Uppleby, Uthwatt, Villebois, Weyland. 
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 Poor:  The poor were those surnames where the average estimated wealth at 
death was at least 30% less than the average.  Most of these poor surnames had 
no-one dying probated in 1858-87.  
 
The list of these surnames is:  Aller, Almand, Angler, Anglim, Annings, 
Austell, Backlake, Bagwill, Balsden, Bantham, Bawson, Beetchenow, Bemmer, 
Bevill, Bierley, Biker, Bilcock, Bivens, Blacksall, Blind, Boate, Bollingbrook, 
Booman, Bowel, Brandfield, Brenham, Brickham, Broan, Brummage, Buffee, 
Buie, Bulmore, Bundley, Burlin, Butfoy, Byott, Caddie, Camac, Camamile, Camel, 
Canary, Cansell, Casseldine, Chauncey, Cholmondley, Colcutt, Colmar, Colo, 
Comm, Concoran, Coniston, Cooler, Coten, Courtoy, Crage, Cresson, Cripple, 
Crix, Croud, Dadey, Damery, Damson, Dazley, Dealing, Dearey, Defoe, Delmer, 
Demar, Dement, Denmar, Detnon, Diccox, Dinon, Doss, Draby, Drone, Earing, 
Eggs, Ellmers, Etton, Fabey, Flinch, Follington, Furrow, Garan, Girl, Glansford, 
Glassonbury, Goodhill, Goodlud, Grangey, Greaveson, Gricks, Gussen, Gyle, 
Hallick, Hallos, Halm, Harriet, Haupt, Hestford, Hoborough, Holloron, Horny, 
Hugger, Hutch, Illesley, Jeays, Jenne, Jerden, Jerratt, Joins, Junes, Kilborne, Lamer, 
Lansfield, Layle, Ledge, Ledwell, Lennington, Lerner, Leserve, Leverno, Liebman, 
Linker, Livard, Lofton, Magary, Mallindine, Mallow, Manes, Masten, Maunton, 
Medus, Mien, Mincke, Mittens, Modell, Molly, Monis, Mountaney, Mune, Mutt, 
Nies, Noddles, Osterman, Pagnum, Passan, Pelle, Pitters, Pordham, Potterell, 
Pounceby, Prop, Purvor, Readington, Reddich, Rent, Riddalls, Rowthorn, Ruffitt, 
Sammy, Savers, Scaresbrook, Scharff, Seawood, Seears, Seeby, Sherbourn, Sherrie, 
Sheville, Shimmons, Showman, Sideway, Sidwells, Sifton, Sinnot, Sissey, Sitter, 
Sling, Starker, Stint, Stopper, Stringle, Strut, Sturr, Susan, Talk, Tamen, Tanks, 
Tidder, Tonbridge, Tosbell, Toung, Trencher, Trevellyan, Trivess, Tunnel, Tusker, 
Vallett, Vickerage, Vino, Waldrum, Waldwyn, Wathews, Waude, Weathersby, 
Weet, Witticks, Wressle, Wrest, Yearn, Zouch. 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall Distribution of Probate Wealth 
 
 Using the distribution of the Brown surname probate values and probate rates 
gave an estimate of the overall distribution of wealth at death.  We could then 
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estimate where the average wealth of the rich prosperous rare surname groups 
fell within this overall distribution. 
 
 
Surname Mutation 
 
The principle way in which surnames would change over these years that we 
could observe was by the adoption of hyphenated double names.  Thus some 
Uthwatts became Andrewes-Uthwatt, some Heneages, Heneage-Vivian.  This process 
was mainly found among the surnames of the rich and the prosperous.  We 
included all such hyphenated versions of each rare surname in our data. 
 
 
Emigration and Immigration 
 
 We calculated the expected stock of each surname in our sample for 2002 
using the 1881 stock combined with births and deaths, 1881-2002 (Schurer and 
Woollard 2000, GRO). This estimate was then compared with ONS data on the 
2002 surname distribution of England and Wales. For some names, it was 
obvious that considerable in migration had occurred in recent years. These 
surnames, whose 2002 stock did not reasonably correspond with that expected 
from the 1881 census and the GRO vital records were dropped from the sample.  
